This is the second paper in a series of three (Murphy 2005a, b) on the practice of operations research. In the first paper I described an overall framework for a theory of practice and discussed the potential of cognitive science as an organizing framework of the knowledge and skills that make for good practice. Expertise in the context of OR practice consists of technical knowledge, institutional knowledge, and procedures and heuristics for bringing that knowledge to bear on the problem at hand and organizational issues. I illustrate technical expertise and heuristics using linear programming modeling and infeasibility analysis. Soft-OR techniques are useful for developing an understanding of the more complex and ill-formed issues an organization faces.
My working definition comes from Ericsson and Smith (1991, p. 2) : "Expertise is what distinguishes outstanding individuals in a domain from others." Salthouse (1991) has an interesting perspective on what constitutes expertise. He defines expertise as the circumvention of cognitive limits. This is a useful perspective because many OR/MS models do exactly this, and clearly computers extend our cognitive capabilities.
General learning and experience seem to contribute to expertise in certain areas. Clearly, knowledge of mathematics aids in technical areas such as ours. Yet, one has to have extensive domain knowledge, which is why Ernst and Newell's (1969) idea for a general problem solver did not succeed. I can illustrate this with a personal example. I was the foreman of a jury in a criminal trial; I consciously managed the discussion so that everyone had an opportunity to speak and no one juror could dominate the discussion. We carefully examined the evidence and discussed the testimony. Yet, we unanimously came to the wrong conclusion because we did not have the street smarts to understand the agendas of the witnesses who perjured themselves, even though the majority of the jurors came from working-class neighborhoods similar to those of the witnesses. The judge, who had been through many similar trials, fully understood the true situation and explained what actually occurred in the crime and trial after we had rendered our verdict.
A distinguishing feature of experts is the time they devote to the specific subject area in which they are interested. Simon and Chase (1973) note that it takes 10 years to become expert in chess. Ericcson and Crutcher (1990) find consistent support for the rule of thumb that it takes 10 years for someone to become an expert. Ericsson and Charness (1997) state that practice is not enough; structured learning and effortful adaptation are critical. To grow, those becoming experts must revisit what they did and understand their actions. Ericsson and Charness note that advanced chess players spend four hours per day Interfaces 35(4), pp. 313-322, © 2005 INFORMS studying published games. As they study, they predict moves and, if wrong, identify the reasons why the player made each move. This ability to predict consequences of moves limits one's need for searching when deciding which move to make.
In many areas, expertise is illusory. Cammerer and Johnson (1991) note that, in most studies comparing regression analysis with experts, regression wins. Index funds beat around three quarters of all mutual funds managed by financial experts. Shantau (1992) categorizes the kinds of expertise required and finds that the areas with good expert performance are characterized by decisions about things or objects, such as the weather, audits, physics, and insurance. Experts perform poorly when they have to judge the intentions of people and other aspects of human behavior, as do judges, counselors, parole officers, stockbrokers, and student-admissions officers. People are moving targets, and objects are not. Experts' success in these studies mirrors the areas of success described in practice papers where the models mostly represent systems of objects, such as aircraft. When people are included in models, as in crew scheduling, personal agendas do not have to be considered. OR has negligible role in managing universities, where the issues are managing people who are individualists and have their own agendas. Weakness in inferring the agenda of a client is a prime cause for project failure (Mehring and Gutterman 1990) and is a constant topic of discussion.
Experts reason at a more abstract level and use more principles than others. Zeitz (1997) says that experts gravitate toward representations that are as thematic, streamlined, and global as possible (Table 1) .
According to Shantau (1992) , experts tend to follow certain strategies. They make continuous adjustments, get help from others, use decision aids, avoid (2) Are you choosing among many or few decisions? Having many decisions usually leads to a mathematical program that coordinates the myriad decisions. If the choices are few, simulation can be useful. If the choices are simple and randomness does not dominate, a spreadsheet may be sufficient.
(3) How complex is the situation? If it is very complex, you must understand this complexity and abstract the situation into connected smaller problems. You may need a multimodel approach.
(4) Do the actions of another person or other persons affect the value of your choices, and do your decisions affect them? If so, the situation may be a game.
(5) Is the outcome affected by aggregates of population? If so, you must represent the effect of the aggregate responses, as in econometric and economic equilibrium models.
(6) Is coordination central to making a good decision or good decisions? If yes, either a systems analysis or a mathematical program would be useful. -If yes, must the decision(s) be robust in the face of uncertainty, and is there no recourse to the uncertain outcomes? A scenario analysis using a deterministic model is probably sufficient.
-If yes, and the decision can be adjusted as more is learned, then a stochastic program or dynamic program could be the right model.
-Are few choices available? Then simulation can be a good tool.
(8) Are the choices discrete or can they be represented as continuous variables? The former situation leads to integer programming, unless the values of the integer variables are large and a continuous solution can be rounded into an integer solution.
(9) What is the time dimension? Are time stages important? If there are many time stages and few choices, consider dynamic programming or simulation. Time-staged linear programming works when you can ignore uncertainty.
I do not make definitive choices and I use such fuzzy terms as many and few because modelers must constantly reassess the reasonableness of any assumptions and choices. This checklist is just a start, and as you develop expertise, the list of questions becomes more elaborate when you are refining modeling choices from broad model types to the specifics of the model you finally implement.
I can illustrate some aspects of the choices with the classic manpower-planning problem. The military uses linear programming (LP) for manpower planning because it works with aggregates, deals with large numbers of people where averages are appropriate, and is concerned about setting training budgets and overall readiness. For a small company with structured labor categories, LP can be useful. However, it is not sufficient because a small company does not have large numbers in each category and must have backups in case of illness or departures. For this problem, it would also need stochastic models to account for random departures.
Expertise in Linear-Programming Modeling and Analysis: Formulation
To illustrate modeling expertise, I will look at elements of the different levels of expertise in LP modeling and analysis, going from the lowest to the highest.
One can formulate textbook problems adequately using a five-step procedure:
(1) State the goal.
(2) List the decisions across the top of a page.
(3) Construct the objective function just below the decisions by using cost or revenue data times the relevant activity and combining the terms using the appropriate sign.
(4) List in separate rows all of the restrictions on the activities.
(5) Fill in the right-hand sides and body of the matrix using the appropriate limits and transformation coefficients.
These constitute the first principles that can be used for any problem. However, the cognitive distance between these steps and any real problem is very large. The next step is to recognize LP model types. Schrage (1997) organizes his book around the different types of models, illustrating how each model can be used for a range of problems. The model types form a semantic net of model structures that are useful in formulating models. Murphy and Panchanadam (1999) describe a categorization based on the type of transformation in the model. These categories are the LP equivalent of the algebra word-problem categories Mayer (1992, p. 470) presents. By recognizing model types, an expert can complete submodels of a linear program in chunks rather than activity by activity. Chunking reduces the cognitive complexity of models. Chase and Simon (1973) describe how experts chunk, and Willemain (1994 Willemain ( , 1995 and Sklar and Pick (1990) analyze expert behavior based on observations of experts doing case examples. These categorizations facilitate a forward-search strategy because the models' properties and their uses limit what models are appropriate in a given situation. One can develop a more elaborate semantic net by studying papers about different applications of LP. By doing this, one can both elaborate on the semantic net of models and provide a framework for organizing problem types. Murphy (1996) provides a bibliography of the early literature on the different LP model formulations. Through the proactive study of these papers, just as chess players study chess games, you can improve your modeling skills.
By following the five-step procedure, one obtains a formulation but not necessarily the best one. In the case of product-mix and transportation problems, the formulations will be clean. However, when models contain resources that increase and decrease over time, as in labor-force-planning models, novices often come up with messy formulations. For example, if regular employees quit at the rate of 10 percent per period and the business can hire in every period, students will often write technically correct formulations with hiring variables, h t , that look like the following: period 1 1h 1 period 2 0 9h 1 + 1h 2 period 3 0 9 2 h 1 + 0 9h 2 + 1h 3 period 4 0 9 3 h 1 + 0 9 2 h 2 + 0 9h 3 + h 4
Instead, they could write the cleaner formulation with balance rows and stock variables e t as follows:
After formulating the model the hard way, they then learn the rules for material-balance constraints. The template models alone rarely solve real problems. For example, modelers often combine productmix models with transportation models, and a time dimension leads to inventory variables and linking constraints across periods. Also, one has to distinguish materials, which are consumed in the production process, from resources, which provide capacity that can be used, when linking submodels. Given this distinction, one learns to use systems diagrams to break problems down into submodels and then construct the submodels, linking them with material balances and transportation models.
At the next level of expertise, one learns to sort out relevant from irrelevant details. Students get a taste of this expertise in high-quality case studies. Journeyman modelers may allow the models to get too big for the decisions to be made. Alternatively, they may leave out important problem elements, such as uncertainties. Experts do not necessarily achieve the right balance immediately when building new models. However, they recognize imbalances when they occur and revise their models and test them to understand the contributions from various components. They use the strategies for achieving the right level of abstraction that Shantau (1992) describes.
Experts are always working at the margin between costs and benefits in the model size and structure. This margin is always changing as computing costs drop and software gets better at data handling, model generation, and solution. A hundred variables was large in the early 1950s, 10,000 in the 1970s, and around a million now. Furthermore, expertise is not static. The first of the two formulations with hiring variables I outlined was thought to be a good representation in the 1950s because it had fewer variables than the second. Early practitioners did not know that it was also numerically less stable (Murphy 1996) . As another example, a deterministic formulation of the feed-mix model was standard for many years, and now analysts use stochastic representations to capture variability in the nutrients in the grains fed to animals (Roush et al. 1994) .
Journeyman LP modelers commonly place too many bounds on the variables. Essentially, the bounds predetermine the results. Nonexperts rely on bounds to get desired results because they do not have the right structures in the model to capture the relevant economic trade-offs, and when the primal solution looks strange, they use bounds to take care of the problem quickly and easily while subverting the value of the solution. Experts understand the deeper economics of the model that cause the numbers to come out the way they do and either accept the results as insights or improve the representation in the model. Also, they take more time to understand the physical processes to be represented, as Woolsey (1998) emphasizes.
Expert LP modelers understand economics as a theoretical framework for modeling and analysis. A key economic concept is the notion of substitutes and complements. Inputs that must be used together to produce an output are complements. Different inputs to different activities that produce the same thing are substitutes. Inventories allow firms to substitute previous-period production for current production. Transportation models and inventory submodels are examples of pure substitutes. When the proportions of the inputs can change in a complement structure, the formulation should be a nonlinear program, a linear program with an extreme-point approximation to the nonlinear production function, or a discrete set of alternative technologies. Understanding the notions of complements and substitutes helps modelers to develop model structures and to diagnose infeasibilities.
I have described the kinds of considerations that are part of expertise in modeling with LP. No piece of these considerations is rocket science. However, the accumulation of theoretical knowledge in LP and economics and experience-based choices of model structures leads to a repertoire of rules and large semantic nets that facilitate model formulation.
Finding the Sources of Infeasible Solutions
Building the model is only the first step in an effective analysis using LP, and even more expertise is necessary to interpret the model results. In the first runs, the model is regularly infeasible. Finding the source of the infeasibility is different from building a model, because it is a search process. A common mistake novices make is to root around mechanically for the cause of an infeasibility in or near the constraint that the solver declared infeasible rather than to reason from the model structure in a forward search.
Because infeasibilities result from the way the model represents or misrepresents the actual situation, no theory can pinpoint the cause in general. Greenberg (1993) describes how to think about diagnosing infeasible solutions and has developed some tools for digging through models. Chinneck (1997) has developed algorithms to help in the isolation process. I have found a few facts and some rules to be useful heuristics. The first fact is that the solver is probably right when it says the model is infeasible, unless the coefficients are improperly scaled. Novices often waste time blaming the solver before starting to work on the model. Second, the variable or row that the solver declares infeasible is rarely the source of the infeasibility. Third, every row and bound with a nonzero dual and every activity in these rows is a candidate cause, and the search for infeasibilities is a process of eliminating causes. This last rule depends on the solver providing the right duals on termination.
When three or more rows associated with a single activity are involved in the infeasibility, the cause typically is in a complement structure with multiple inputs or outputs, such as
Many of the activities in an LP model have a pure substitute structure, one input and one output. Examples are transportation and inventory variables that connect submodels with complement structures in the variables. Activities with pure substitute structures proliferate the positive duals around the LP, and when they do not, you should figure out why. For example, in a model with inventories and no backlogging, if period n is infeasible in the product balance row but the balance row in period 1 is not part of the infeasibility, something is disconnecting the potential flow of inventory to subsequent periods. If the infeasibility repeats across replicated submodels and the submodels are not connected by columns that intersect rows with positive duals, look for a structural or data flaw that is common to all submodels. If the submodels are connected, look for a problem in aggregate inputs or outputs. You can construct a whole set of heuristics for what should be examined around substitute and complement structures in the model.
Finding infeasibilities in large models is not necessarily harder than it is in small models because large models are generally collections of submodels that can be examined in isolation. When the infeasibility is not isolated in a submodel, the pattern of connecting constraints that are involved in the infeasibility can highlight missing activities or aggregate imbalances between supply and demand. Again, one can create search heuristics around the patterns of infeasibilities that are or are not repeated across submodels and more heuristics for patterns involving submodel links.
I have discussed heuristics for finding infeasibilities. You cannot immediately distinguish between data and structural flaws, and heuristics help you to isolate the source. Furthermore, each heuristic looks for patterns that reduce the potential source(s) of the infeasibility and allows forward-search strategies.
Although many different heuristics and algorithms exist for finding the source(s) of infeasible solutions and the search can become very arcane, the underlying procedure is simple:
(1) Isolate the rows and columns that contain the infeasibility.
(2) Apply a heuristic that suggests an area of the model for detailed examination.
(3) Decide whether you have found the source either by direct examination or a test run.
(4) Stop, or remove from consideration the rows and columns you have evaluated, and return to
Step 2.
Interpreting and Explaining the Solution
Once the model actually runs, the results have to be interpreted. The primal solution describes what happened, and the duals and reduced costs explain why. The economic concept of market-clearing prices helps to frame the whys. Even if the model does not have demand curves, you can think of each activity as an independent economic agent that is a price taker facing market-clearing prices in the duals. The duals explain the agent's economic incentives and resulting behavior. McCarl (1998) discusses this and other insights into model debugging.
The next level of interpretation comes from explaining the results in the context of the subject modeled in a way that informs discussions and decision making. The first step is to understand what in the model led to the result and to judge whether the relevant model structures represent reality appropriately. If not, the results may still be usable (Hodges 1991) . Alternatively, you can reinitiate the modeling cycle. The next step is to ban the phrase "the model says" and couch the discussion in the context of the subject modeled.
Framing the results so that they aid understanding and facilitate decision making is the most important job of the analyst. In operational models that are used regularly, everyone develops intuition about what the model says and understands any one run easily. However, analysts must frame the results of policy models for people with no immediate context or technical skills. Even if the work is technically correct, analysts do not succeed if they don't communicate the appropriate insights to be gained.
I can illustrate this with a couple of examples from projects I worked on at the Energy Information Administration of the United States Department of Energy. We had been asked to do a study for a congressional committee on the potential of a price spike in natural gas as a result of the phaseout of natural-gas price controls. We built a small model that captured the dynamics of gas markets and the standard set of base, optimistic, and pessimistic scenarios. The modeling was a complete success and became a prototype for the next two generations of energy models, the Intermediate Future Forecasting System (IFFS) and National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) (Murphy and Shaw 1995) . The analysis showed that a spike could occur if the economy were to grow rapidly or the resource base were lower than the best guess. Otherwise, the transition would be smooth. More important, if a spike were to occur, the years immediately preceding the removal of price caps would have shortages. The basic conclusion was that anything could happen, including bad outcomes.
As a colleague pointed out after we delivered the report, the analysis should have been written as a decision analysis looking at the choice between raising the ceiling early to eliminate potential shortages or keeping the ceilings. If the ceilings were retained and there were no price spike, the ceilings would not bind and higher ceilings would not lead to higher prices. Thus, raising ceilings had no economic costs if the outcomes were good and there were large benefits of avoiding costly shortages associated with bad outcomes. Framed this way, the choice is obvious. One does not need a precise forecast as long as one leaves out the political costs of reopening debates and old wounds left from fights over the legislation that had just passed. In actuality, the spike did not occur when the ceilings phased out, a good outcome incorrectly perceived to be the result of good decisions. Most likely Congress would not have acted until the shortages appeared because of the political costs of resuming a debate on the subject. However, we lost an opportunity to introduce the concept of policy robustness in the face of uncertainty.
An analysis can be framed in the wrong way from the beginning. After Congress had passed and President Carter had signed major energy legislation, Congress asked for an assessment of the new laws and their impacts on energy markets. This turned into a major 20-volume study on energy markets that was a technical success, but we did not communicate the results properly (Dickens et al. 1983) .
Congress asked us to compare the old regulatory regime and the new laws. However, between the final passage of the legislation and the request, the forecasting system had undergone a major revision in which all of the model representations of the old regulations were removed. The agreement with the congressional staffers on the study design was that we would not compare the new regime with the old; instead, we would compare it with completely deregulated markets. The analytical result was that the new regime and deregulated markets looked essentially the same.
In the report, we emphasized the lack of a difference between the two policy scenarios. Politically, the report was read as another example of Carter's ineffectuality as president. Using the report, a Texas newspaper began the headline of an editorial on Carter's accomplishments in energy with "Zilch!" In truth, the legislation had substantial impacts compared to the old regulatory regime, and that the policies came close to deregulated markets was a major achievement of the Carter administration.
Rather than say that the then-current policy was "no different from" deregulated markets, the report should have said that the policies "achieved the effect of" deregulated markets. Also, we could have implemented easily modeled regulations, such as the price controls on oil, to illustrate the positive impacts of the laws that had been passed.
I did not realize the extent of the harm done until I was at a luncheon seated next to the undersecretary of the Department of Energy and got a very emotional response to my question asking him what he thought of the study.
Expertise in Problem Structuring
Too often we take symptoms as the problem rather than fully understand the problem. The tools of soft OR are useful in understanding complicated systems problems. Pidd and Woolley (1980) offer four methods for structuring problems; these methods have been subsequently subsumed in soft OR. Rosenhead (1989) views soft OR and hard OR as complementary to each other when he notes that they are two distinct consulting activities, problem structuring and problem solving, respectively. Pauley and Ormerod (1998) explain how to blend the two. Rosenhead (1989) covers the different approaches considered parts of soft OR. I will discuss soft systems methodology (SSM) (Checkland 1989 and Checkland and Scholes 1990) and strategic options development and analysis (SODA) (Eden 1989) . Ormerod (1996) describes an application of this approach to the design of an information system. Soft OR techniques are appropriate for problems with poorly defined initial states and poorly defined goal states. Analysts use them to induce structure for developing strategies for organizations. They use schemas and rules to organize the process of developing an understanding of the situation and the relevant issues and to resolve the underlying problems or issues. A focus on understanding the problem is consistent with Woolsey's approach, but soft OR emphasizes strategic problems, for which the process of achieving an understanding is different. Unlike the examples Woolsey (1998) describes in which students take jobs on factory floors or fire trucks, students do not get the CEO's job for a week to experience the work and understand the strategic problem. Instead, soft OR consists of techniques for eliciting perceptions, information, and ideas from the people in the organization and structuring that information and synthesizing it into a coherent understanding of the issues. For example, Ormerod (1996) describes a project that entails rethinking the information structure of Sainsbury's, a supermarket chain in Great Britain, with the goal of achieving a competitive advantage.
SSM uses schemas to capture the relevant features of the situation and their interrelationships and uses procedures that structure the process of problem structuring. SSM begins with a master heuristic procedure, the overall guiding steps for the analysis. Originally the approach consisted of seven steps, but it has been expanded to distinguish between what are termed cultural analyses and logic-based analyses. The steps are as follows:
(1) Describe the problem situation and the relevant organizational history.
(2) Enumerate tasks that must be done and issues that are the points of disagreement.
(3) In the logic-based stream of analyses, -Enumerate, name, and model the relevant human activity systems,
-Compare the models with the situation based on peoples' perceptions, and -Use the comparisons to structure a debate about change.
(4) In the cultural stream, -Analyze the intervention itself because the act of undertaking it already effects change, (6) Delineate changes that can improve the system and are culturally feasible.
(7) Take action to improve the situation. This master procedure leads to other procedures for executing each of the steps. The procedures I list next are for filling out schemas for understanding the logic and cultural streams. The logic-stream procedure is an elaboration of (3), and it describes the root definitions of the relevant systems and builds the conceptual models of the systems named in the root definitions. The schema used is based on the mnemonic CATWOE, which summarizes the six elements:
(1) Customers, the victims or beneficiaries of the transformation process;
(2) Actors, those who perform the transformation process;
(3) Transformation processes, the conversion of input to output; (4) Weltanschauung, the worldview that makes the transformation meaningful in context; (5) Owners, those who can stop the transformation; and (6) Environmental constraints, elements outside the system that are taken as given. Checkland and Scholes (1990, p. 43 ) also have a schema for comparing the conceptual model with the real-world situation. For the cultural stream, they draw "rich pictures" that express relationships, especially among people or groups, and value judgments; use symbols to "convey the 'feel' of the situation"; and indicate the relationships that can impede the implementation of solutions.
SODA begins from the psychological and cultural perspective that individuals have differing perceptions about an organization and that their perceptions are central to understanding the issues in the organization. Furthermore, the organization is an enterprise negotiated among these individuals. The master procedure can be stated as follows:
(1) Gather the perceptions of the individuals in the organization.
(2) Draw a cognitive map of the perceptions, either -Work from the goal of the system to the detailed options, or -Work from the detailed options to the goal of the system.
(3) Merge the individual cognitive maps into a larger map.
(4) Cluster the elements into related areas.
(5) Hold a workshop so that participants can work through the map repeatedly and cyclically, absorbing emerging issues, seeing details, and moving towards actions.
(6) Take action. The cognitive map is the schema for organizing people's perceptions of the situation and the alternative actions. The map looks like an influence diagram for decision analysis and like the diagram used in building systems-dynamics models. All of these diagrams indicate systems interactions. (Influence diagrams are semantic nets of influence relationships among entities.) The clustering process is a reorganization of the diagram based on a schema that is like an is-a hierarchy in a semantic net.
The procedures for the two approaches are quite similar. Yet SSM starts from the classical systemsengineering model by asking the question, what is the problem? while SODA begins with the psychological interactions. They are similar for many reasons, for example, they address the same categories of problems, those with poorly defined initial and goal states; the procedures fit the same pattern of procedures used to explore a subject or an issue; and each has taken on aspects of the other as their developers talked to each other.
Five out of the seven steps in SSM cover aspects of problem understanding, as do five out of the six steps in SODA. Furthermore, the schemas are devoted to problem structuring. Again, the SSM and SODA procedures fit into the pattern of the heuristics described here. The general pattern is as follows: understand the problem, generate alternatives, and try the most promising until you find a satisfactory solution, repeating steps as necessary. The areas emphasized and expertise needed are different from the other procedures I have listed. Users of soft OR can have expertise in organizational design, information systems design, or social systems. Kimbrough and Murphy (2005) use the SSM framework and social networks to understand the technology economy in the Philadelphia region and to suggest interventions to increase its size. We found that using SSM for opening questions and organizing results was quite useful. In interviews, we made a point of understanding people's motivations, interests, and circumstances so that we could understand their perspectives and filter their views.
Although soft OR was explicitly designed as a practice tool, only 10 percent of practitioners surveyed in the UK used it (Munro and Mingers 2004) . Based on my experience, I think the reason is not that the methodology is flawed. Rather, it is intended to help analysts with complicated strategic questions, which are not as common as process and technical questions that practitioners can address using standard OR tools.
Nevertheless, the soft OR frameworks help analysts to keep their organizational antennae operating during projects, which is important, because the agendas of people in organizations are major determinants of the success of modeling projects. When embarking on a modeling project, keeping CATWOE in mind without doing a full SSM study can help a practitioner recognize the organizational minefields. Mehring and Gutterman (1990) describe a case in which such agendas subverted a project.
Deciding When a Model Is Useful
Model builders become psychologically attached to their models and can have difficulty judging their utility. They can run new operational models in parallel with current systems to measure the improvements they provide. If they cannot do that, they can at least compare the model results with the experiences of those managing the operations. However, one cannot run a policy model in parallel with the system being modeled. Imagine varying the money supply in an economy to test a new economic theory. This problem has led researchers to work on model validation.
The subject has its own extensive literature; I will mention only a few papers. Gass (1983) develops methods for validating government policy models. Fossett et al. (1991) describe how the methodology was applied to a simulation model. Hodges (1991) has an interesting perspective in that he articulates ways models can be used even if they are "bad."
Conclusions
Because technical skills are deep knowledge in a narrow domain, certain broadly applicable OR skills, such as matrix generation and model debugging, can be and are learned in a structured manner through course work. Unless an industry is so large that schools can offer programs tailored to that industry, as they do for financial services, people develop industry expertise on the job.
Modeling and analysis will always be crafts with nuanced expertise coming through practice. People develop expertise through structured learning and doing in one or more domains. They develop expertise in recognizing and structuring problems gradually over time. Experienced practitioners draw on a breadth of experience. People who are expert in problem recognition and structuring typically start with narrow problem or tool domains and extend their expertise as they gain experience with different projects in related domains. Experienced practitioners know when the problem presented is a symptom and not the real problem. The key is structured questioning and listening, picking up cues from conversations with people operating in the system under study. Soft OR is one formalization of these skills.
I ordered the original list of skills in the first paper (Murphy 2005a ) of this series from the most technical to the most managerial. Successful practitioners move from deep knowledge in narrow domains to knowledge in broad areas and from an ability to work with things to an ability to work with people. Not all people can or should move to managerial roles. At the same time, OR practitioners do not have to give up entirely the joy of technical work when they take on managerial functions in an organization.
If we can document OR practitioners' skills and expertise, we can codify their expertise, accelerate the development of expertise in people new to the profession, and better communicate what OR practitioners have to offer.
